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INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S
ASSOCIA TION v. ALLIED INTERNA TIONL,
INC.: SUPREME COURT AVOIDS
SPECIFIC GUIDELINES TO
DETERMINE ILLEGALITY OF POLITICALLY-
MOTIVATED SECONDARY BOYCOTTS
I. INTRODUCTION
The National Labor Relations Act (hereinafter NLRA),I protects
both employers and employees from unfair labor practices. Accord-
ingly, section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA prohibits secondary boycotts.' Tra-
ditionally, a secondary boycott occurs when a labor organization exerts
pressure on an employer with whom it is involved in a dispute (the
primary employer) by coercing another employer, with whom the labor
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1976).
2. Section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976), is commonly known as
the secondary boycott prohibition. However, the statute, by its terms, does not differentiate
primary and secondary activity. In fact, the term "secondary boycott" does not appear in
section 8(b)(4). Rather, section 8(b)(4) proscribes specified conduct if it is engaged in with
specified objectives. Section 8(b)(4) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-
(4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by
any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage
in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, pro-
cess, transport or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or
commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any
person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either
case an object thereof is-
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, trans-
porting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or
manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person ....
Title 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1976) defines the terms "person," "commerce," and "affecting com-
merce," and provides in relevant part that:
(1) The term "person" includes one or more individuals, labor organizations,
partnerships, associations, [or] corporations. ...
(6) The term "commerce" means trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or
communication among the several States, .. or between any foreign country and
any State. ...
(7) The term "affecting commerce" means in commerce, or burdening or ob-
structing commerce or the free flow of commerce, or having led or tending to lead
to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of
commerce.
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organization has no dispute (the neutral or secondary employer), to
cease doing business with the primary employer. By causing a cessa-
tion of business between the primary and secondary employers, the la-
bor organization attempts to further its goals in the dispute with the
primary employer (the primary dispute). As a result, the labor organi-
zation entangles the secondary employer in the primary dispute.
3
In International Longshoremen's Association v. Allied International,
Inc. ,' the United States Supreme Court declared that a labor organiza-
tion's politically-motivated boycott of Soviet goods constituted a secon-
dary boycott prohibited by section 8(b)(4)(B) of the NLRA.5 To reach
this conclusion, the Supreme Court addressed three major issues:
(1) whether the union's conduct was within the commerce jurisdiction
of the NLRA;6 (2) whether the union's conduct constituted a secondary
boycott within the NLRA proscription;7 and (3) whether prohibiting
the union's conduct infringed upon the first amendment rights of the
labor organization and/or its members.8
The purpose of this casenote is to analyze the Supreme Court's
resolution of each of these issues and the guidelines its reasoning pro-
vides for lower courts that will confront these issues in the future. This
note suggests that the Court's resolution of the commerce jurisdiction
issue injected some confusion into the traditional test of commerce ju-
risdiction while establishing only that the effects of union conduct are
relevant to determining whether secondary activity is "in commerce."
In addition, this note will show that the Court's analysis of the secon-
dary boycott issue simply reaffirmed the "ruin or substantial loss" test
used to determine whether secondary union conduct violates section
8(b)(4)(B), yet contributed little to the definition of ruin or substantial
loss. Finally, because the Court failed to consider the political motiva-
tion behind the International Longshoremen's Association's conduct
3. The following hypothetical presents an example of a successful secondary boycott:
A union is involved in a dispute with employer A. A is, therefore, the "primary" em-
ployer and the dispute between A and the union is the "primary" dispute. A does business
with B, another employer, whose employees are represented by the union; B is not involved
in the primary dispute. Therefore, B is the neutral or "secondary" employer. The union
induces B's employees to refuse to work for B unless B ceases doing business with A. To
avoid the costs of a work stoppage, B ceases doing business with A. As a result, A is forced
to choose between losing further business as a result of further union action or capitulating
to the union's demands in the primary dispute. Thus, A is pressured into complying with
the union's demands in the primary dispute.
4. 456 U.S. 212 (1982).
5. Id. at 218.
6. Id at 220-22.
7. Id at 222-26.
8. Id at 226-27.
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and based its resolution of the first amendment issue entirely on its
determination that the union's conduct was an illegal secondary boy-
cott, its reasoning and holding simply reaffirmed the general rule that
unlawful conduct is not protected by the first amendment. Therefore,
this note will conclude that the Court's reasoning established only very
broad general guidelines for the resolution of these issues in future
cases.
9
II. FACTS OF THE CASE
In January, 1980, Thomas Gleason, President of the International
Longshoremen's Association (hereinafter ILA), issued a directive or-
dering ILA members to cease handling cargo bound for or originating
in the Soviet Union. The boycott was announced to be a political pro-
test of the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan. As a result of the
directive, longshoremen refused to service ships carrying Soviet
cargo. °
Allied International, Inc. (hereinafter Allied) is a Massachusetts
corporation which imports Soviet wood products for resale in the
United States. Allied contracted with Waterman Steamship Lines
(hereinafter Waterman), a New York freight company operating ships
of United States registry, to ship wood from the Soviet Union to six
ports in the United States, including Boston. Waterman employed a
Massachusetts stevedore company, John T. Clark & Son of Boston, Inc.
(hereinafter Clark) to unload its ships in Boston." Clark employed
ILA longshoremen pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement be-
tween the ILA, Local 799, and the Boston Shipping Association, of
9. Courts may confront these issues again in the context of a politically motivated sec-
ondary boycott because, in December of 1981, the ILA announced a boycott of Polish cargo
to protest the imposition of martial law in Poland. N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1981, at 11, col. 4.
The announcement stated in part:
Out of sympathy with our striking Polish brothers, the ILA is directing its
members not to handle any cargo to and/or from Poland on any vessel until such
time as martial law, the detention of trade union leaders and the denial of the civil
rights of the Polish people come to an end.
N.Y. Daily News, Dec. 22, 1981, at 2, col. 3.
10. 456 U.S. at 214-15.
11. Walsh v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 488 F. Supp. 524, 525 (D. Mass.
1980). Allied Int'l, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 492 F. Supp. 334 (D. Mass.
1980), was consolidated with Walsh. Therefore, some facts of 411ied are found in Walsh.
Walsh grew out of the same unfair labor practice charge filed by Allied against the ILA.
NLRB Regional Director, Michael F. Walsh, petitioned the United States District Court for
the District of Massachusetts for a section 10(e) injunction pending the NLRB's resolution
of Allied's unfair labor practice charge.
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which Clark is a member.' 2 As a result of the ILA boycott, Clark was
unable to obtain longshoremen to unload Waterman's ships which
were carrying Allied's imports.'3 Consequently, Allied's shipments of
Soviet wood products were completely disrupted.'
4
Allied sued the ILA in the United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts, alleging that the ILA was engaging in a sec-
ondary boycott in violation of section 8(b)(4)(B) of the NLRA. Allied
sought damages under section 303 of the Labor-Management Relations
Act.' 5 The court dismissed the complaint, 6 stating that it failed to al-
lege a violation of section 8(b)(4)(B) because the ILA action was a
political 'primary boycott of Russian goods, with incidental effects
upon those employers who deal in such goods."' 7 As a primary boy-
cott, the ILA action was not within the scope of section 8(b)(4)(B).'8
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed and held that Al-
lied had alleged a violation of section 8(b)(4)(B).' 9 The court found
12. 456 U.S. at 215.
13. 488 F. Supp. at 526.
14. 456 U.S. at 215-16.
15. Allied Int'l, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 492 F. Supp. 334, 336 (D.
Mass. 1980). Section 303 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1976),
creates a private damages remedy for secondary boycott victims and provides in pertinent
part:
(a) It shall be unlawful, for the purpose of this section only, in an industry or
activity affecting commerce, for any labor organization to engage in any activity or
conduct defined as an unfair labor practice in section 158(b)(4) of this title.
(b) Whoever shall be injured in his business or property by reason [oil any
violation of subsection (a). . .may sue therefor in any district court of the United
States. . .and shall recover the damages by him sustained and the cost of the suit.
16. 492 F. Supp. at 339. Allied advanced three theories to justify injunctive and mone-
tary relief from the ILA's action: (1) violation of the NLRA secondary boycott provision;
(2) violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act prohibition on restraints of trade; and (3) interna-
tional interference with contractual relations. Id at 335-36. The court held that Allied had
failed to state a cause of action under any of the three theories asserted. Id at 339.
17. Walsh, 488 F. Supp. at 531 (emphasis added). See 492 F. Supp. at 338 (ILA's boy-
cott is "wholly politically oriented with no apparent economic benefit accruing to the union
or its members.").
18. Title 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1976) contains a proviso which states "[t]hat nothing
contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise un-
lawful, any primary strike or primary picketing." The district court in Walsh determined
that the ILA action was a primary boycott of Soviet goods because
[t]he ILA has not induced a strike against Allied, Waterman, or Clark; nor does it
seek to pressure those employers not to deal with one another. No picket lines
have been established and no other employees have been prevented from work.
Union members have simply declined to accept employment on certain ships, as a
form of political protest.
488 F. Supp. at 530-31.
19. Allied Int'l, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 640 F.2d 1368, 1379 (1st
Cir. 1981). The court determined that the district court had properly dismissed Allied's
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that: (1) the ILA conduct was within the commerce jurisdiction of the
NLRA;2 ° (2) the ILA action constituted prohibited secondary activ-
ity;2 and (3) prohibiting the ILA from ordering employees to cease
handling Soviet goods would not infringe upon the first amendment
guarantee of free speech.22 The United States Supreme Court granted
the ILA's writ of certiorari,2 3 adopted the reasoning of the court of ap-
peals and affirmed its ruling.24
III. HiSTORICAL SETrING
A. Legislation
Prior to 1932, there were no federal statutes designed to govern
labor relations. However, the Sherman Antitrust Act of 189025 func-
tioned as a significant curb on secondary union activity because federal
courts used it as authority to issue injunctions against "virtually every
collective activity of labor as an unlawful restraint of trade. ' 26 Re-
sponding to union protests, Congress enacted the Clayton Act of
1914,27 which prohibited federal courts from issuing injunctions in con-
troversies "involving, or growing out of, a dispute concerning terms or
conditions of employment. ' 28 Subsequent judicial interpretation -of the
Clayton Act revealed that it immunized primary, but not secondary,
union activities from the antitrust laws.29 Thus, federal courts could
still enjoin secondary union activities as unlawful restraints of trade.
The Norris-LaGuardia Act of 193230 was the first legislation
allegation of (1) violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act and (2) international interference
with contractual relations. Id at 1379-82.
20. Id at 1371-74.
21. Id at 1374-78.
22. Id at 1378-79.
23. International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, Inc., 454 U.S. 814 (1981).
24. 456 U.S. at 218.
25. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
26. National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 620 (1967) (footnote
omitted).
27. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-44 (1976).
28. 386 U.S. at 621 (quoting § 20 of the Clayton Act).
29. Id at 621-22. See also Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
30. 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1976). The belief that industrial strife inter-
fered with the public interest in the free flow of commerce led Congress to enact labor legis-
lation pursuant to its power to regulate interstate commerce. NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil
Corp., 371 U.S. 224,226 (1963). See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947),
reprintedin 93 CONG. RFc. 6369 (daily ed. June 4, 1947) ("experience has demonstrated that
certain practices by some labor organizations have the effect of burdening commerce
through strikes and other forms of industrial unrest or through concerted activities which
impair the interest of the public in the free flow of commerce"). See also U.S. CoNsT. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have power.. . to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
1984]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17
designed to regulate employer-employee relations. It prohibited fed-
eral courts from issuing injunctions "in any case involving or growing
out of any labor dispute."'" Because the term "labor dispute" was de-
fined broadly, federal courts could enjoin neither primary nor -secon-
dary union activities.32 Therefore, the Norris-LaGuardia Act severely
limited the use of injunctions to halt secondary boycotts. As a result,
unions were free to engage in secondary boycotts without judicial
interference.
Violence associated with disputes between newly formed unions
and employers led Congress to enact the NLRA.33 The NLRA secured
to employees the right to organize34 and bargain collectively with em-
ployers.35  It required employers to bargain in good faith and pro-
scribed certain forms of employer conduct as unfair labor practices.36
and among the several States. . . ."). Consequently, the federal labor laws govern only
labor controversies which are "in commerce" or are "affecting commerce." See supra note 2
for statutory definitions of "commerce" and "affecting commerce." Congress sought to put
workers in a bargaining position equal to that of employers by ending easy access by em-
ployers to injunctions against workers attempting to organize for the purpose of improving
working conditions. See S. REP. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1932), reprinted in R.
KORETZ & B. SCHWARTZ, STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: LABOR ORGANI-
ZATION 173-74 (1970) (primary object of Norris-LaGuardia Act to protect rights of employ-
ees to freedom of association, to organize, and to be represented by unions in negotiations
with employers).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). Section 101 provides that "no court of the United States...
shall have jurisdiction to issue any. . injunction in a case involving or growing out of a
labor dispute, except in a strict conformity with the provisions of this chapter. .. ."
32. 386 U.S. at 622-23. See also H.R. REP. No. 669, 72d Cong., Ist Sess. 8 (1932). Sec-
tion 13(c) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act provides:
When used in this Act, and for the purposes of this Act-
(c) The term "labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning terms or condi-
tions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or condi-
tions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the prox-
imate relation of employer and employee.
33. 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1976)). The NLRA
is also known as the Wagner Act. Section 141(b) sets forth the intent and purpose of the
NLRA and reads in part:
It is the purpose and policy of this chapter, in order to promote the full flow of
commerce, to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees and employers in
their relations affecting commerce, to provide orderly and peaceful procedures for
preventing the interference by either with the legitimate rights of the other, to pro-
tect the rights of individual employees in their relations with labor organizations
whose activities affect commerce, to define and proscribe practices on the part of
labor and management which affect commerce and are inimical to the general wel-
fare, and to protect the rights of the public in connection with labor disputes affect-
ing commerce.
34. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
35. Id at § 159(a).
36. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1976). Interference with the formation or administration of un-
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However, the NLRA imposed no similar requirement on unions, nor
did it prohibit abusive union conduct. Furthermore, because Congress
did not repeal the Norris-LaGuardia Act, union abuses could not be
enjoined. As a result, secondary boycotts became powerful weapons
used by unions to gain recognition and economic benefits for their
members. Thus, instead of equalizing bargaining power, the NLRA
had the effect of tipping the balance in favor of the unions.37
To restrain union abuses which arose under the Norris-LaGuardia
Act and the NLRA, Congress enacted the Labor-Management Rela-
tions Act of 1947.38 As an amendment to the NLRA, the statute pro-
scribed union unfair labor practices, including secondary boycotts, 39
and revived the use of the labor injunction to a limited extent by per-
mitting the NLRB (but not private parties) to obtain injunctive relief
from union unfair labor practices without the restrictions imposed by
the Norris-LaGuardia Act.4" In addition, it gave employers a private
right of action in federal court for damages caused by union unfair
labor practices.41
The prohibition of secondary boycotts was originally incorporated
into the NLRA as section 8(b)(4)(A).42 The secondary boycott prohibi-
ions and discrimination against employees on the basis of union membership were two of
the proscribed employer practices.
37. See generally R. DERESHINSKY, THE NLRB AND SECONDARY BoycoTTs 124-25
(1972). See also 93 CONG. REc. 3428 (daily ed. April 15, 1947) ("But times and conditions
have changed and the unions are now strong and powerful--the employer-especially the
one who gives a few jobs, is weak.") (statement of Rep. Hoffman).
38. 61 Stat. 136 (1947).
39. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1976). Other proscribed union labor practices included discrimi-
nation against employees who are not union members and the refusal to bargain collectively
with an employer. Id
40. 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1976). Section 160(1) provides that:
If, after. . . investigation, the [NLRB] officer or regional attorney. . . has reason-
able cause to believe such charge [of an unfair labor practice] is true. . . he shall,
on behalf of the Board, petition any United States district court. . . for appropri-
ate injunctive relief pending the final adjudication of the Board with respect to
such matter.
41. Id at § 187(b). Section 187(b) provides that "[wihoever shall be injured in his busi-
ness or property by. . . any [unfair labor practice] violation. . . may sue therefor in any
district court of the United States. . . and shall recover the damages by him sustained and
the cost of the suit." 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (1976).
42. Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), § 8(b)(4)(A), 61 Stat. 141
(1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1976)). Senator Taft said of its
purpose:
This provision makes it unlawful to resort to a secondary boycott to injure the
business of a third person who is wholly unconcerned in the disagreement between
an employer and his employees. . . . [U]nder the provisions of the Norris-La-
Guardia Act, it became impossible to stop a secondary boycott ... . All this pro-
vision of the bill does is to reverse the effect of the law as to secondary boycotts.
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tion was intended to preserve the right of unions to bring pressure to
bear on offending employers in primary disputes and to protect neutral
parties from pressures resulting from controversies in which they are
not directly involved.43 It thus prohibited unions from inducing or en-
couraging "the employees of any employer to engage in, a strike or
concerted refusal. . . to. . . handle. . . any goods" of a primary em-
ployer. In an effort to close major loopholes which had emerged from
its language, Congress subsequently amended section 8(b)(4)(A) in the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. 4 How-
ever, these changes did not alter the basic thrust of the secondary boy-
cott prohibition.
B. Pre- Allied Judicial Interpretations
1. Commerce jurisdiction
The ILA boycott of Russian goods generated several lawsuits in
addition to Allied: Baldovin v. International Longshoremen's Associa-
tion,41 New Orleans S.S. Association v. General Longshore Workers,46
93 CONG. REc. 4198 (daily ed. April 29, 1947) (statement of Sen. Taft).
43. The Senate Committee Report characterized the conduct prohibited by section
8(b)(4)(A):
Thus, it would not be lawful for a union to engage in a strike against employer A
for the purpose of forcing that employer to cease doing business with employer B;
nor would it be lawful for a union to boycott employer A because employer A uses
or otherwise deals in the goods of or does business with employer B (with whom
the union has a dispute).
S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 22 (1947). See also Local 1976, United Bhd. of
Carpenters and Joiners v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 100 (1958) (Congress "aimed to restrict the
area of industrial conflict insofar as this could be achieved by prohibiting the most obvious,
widespread, and, as Congress evidently judged, dangerous practice of unions to widen that
conflict: the coercion of neutral employers . . . ."); NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951) (secondary boycott provisions serve the "dual con-
gressional objectives of preserving the right of labor organizations to bring pressure to bear
on offending employers in primary labor disputes and of shielding unoffending employers
and others from pressures in controversies not their own.").
44. Three major loopholes had emerged from the language of § 8(b)(4)(A). Because
only inducement of "employees" was proscribed, direct inducement of a supervisor or the
secondary employer was not prohibited. Because only a "strike or a concerted refusal" was
proscribed, pressure upon a single employee was not unlawful. Finally, because railroads
and municipalities were not "employees" within the NLRA, inducing or encouraging their
employees was not forbidden. Subsequent to the Labor-Management Reporting and Dis-
closure Act of 1959 (also known as the Landrum-Griffin amendments), § 8(b)(4)(A) became
§ 8(b)(4)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1976). See NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers and
Warehousemen, 377 U.S. 58, 64-66 (1964).
45. 626 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1980).
46. 626 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1980), affldsub nom., Jacksonville Bulk Term., Inc. v. Interna-
tional Longshoremen's Ass'n, 457 U.S. 702 (1982).
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and Walsh v. International Longshoremen's Association."7 In
Baldovin,48 the most significant of these cases for purposes of under-
standing the significance of the Allied decision, the Fifth Circuit held,
contrary to the Allied Court,4 9 that the ILA boycott of Russian goods
was not within the commerce jurisdiction of the NLRA. 0 The
Baldovin court was asked to determine whether the NLRB had juris-
diction over the ILA's action in accordance with section 10(a) of the
NLRAI which defines the powers of the NLRB with respect to unfair
labor practices. Section 10(a) provides that "[t]he Board is empowered
. . . to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice
* . . affecting commerce. ' 52 Because unfair labor practice charges had
been filed against the ILA,53 the NLRB petitioned for injuctive relief
pursuant to section 10(1) of the NLRA 4 Stating that "[t]he object of
the dispute determines whether or not it is 'in commerce,' -55 and ob-
serving that the object of the ILA's boycott was Soviet military policy
in Afghanistan, the court determined that the ILA's dispute was not
remediable by domestic action. 6 Therefore, the boycott was not "in
commerce" within the meaning of the NLRA57 and the NLRB lacked
47. 630 F.2d 864 (1st Cir. 1980).
48. 626 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1980).
49. See infra notes 168-83 and accompanying text.
50. 626 F.2d at 449-50.
51. Id at 449.
52. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976).
53. 626 F.2d at 448. The ILA was charged with violating section 8(b)(4)(B). Id See
supra note 2 for text of statute.
54. Section 10(1) of the NLRA requires the Regional Director of the NLRB to petition
for a temporary injunction when an unfair labor practice charge has been filed and he has
reason to believe that the charge is true. Section 10(1) provides in relevant part:
(1) Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair labor prac-
tice within the meaning of [§ 8(b)(4)] . . . . [a] preliminary investigation of such
charge shall be made forthwith. . . . If, after such investigation, the officer...
has reasonable cause to believe such charge is true and that a complaint should
issue, he shall, on behalf of the Board, petition any United States district court...
for appropriate injunctive relief pending the final adjudication of the Board with
respect to [the unfair labor practice charge] ....
29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1976). Section 10(1) creates a narrow exception to the anti-injunction
provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Walsh, 630 F.2d at 871.
55. 626 F.2d at 453.
56. Id at 453-54.
57. Id at 449. Citing § 10(a) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976), the court noted
that "[t]he NLRB's jurisdiction over secondary boycotts is also confined to secondary activ-
ity 'affecting commerce."' id Moreover, the court recognized the general limitation of the
NLRA that activities governed thereby must be in or affect commerce. Id Thus, the court
also determined that the ILA boycott was not "in commerce" within the meaning of
§ 8(b)(4). Id Furthermore, the court determined that the ILA refusal to handle Soviet
cargo was a secondary boycott within the meaning of § 8(b)(4). Id Analyzing the language
and intent of the statute, the court stated:
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power to enjoin the boycott.58
Prior to Allied, the Supreme Court had determined that primary
labor disputes between American unions and foreign entities are not
within the commerce jurisdiction of the NLRA when assertion of juris-
diction would inescapably interfere with foreign labor relations, foreign
trade, and comity among nations. This principle derived from a series
of decisions59 involving primary labor activity undertaken by Ameri-
can unions against foreign carriers. Those cases, however, raised no
questions concerning injury to American neutrals.
In the leading case, Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S. 4 ,6o the
Supreme Court held that the NLRA was not applicable to primary la-
The ILA's dispute is exclusively with the Soviet government which is the only au-
thority capable of responding to its protest. The stevedoring, shipping, exporting
or importing companies. . . are completely neutral with regard to the ILA's dis-
pute with the Soviet Union. . . . [Therefore, the ILA boycott] violates the purpose
of the secondary boycott ban: to compel the union to confront the employer with
whom it has its real or primary dispute ....
Id
Noting that § 8(b)(4) prohibits unions from pressuring neutral secondary employers
when one of the union's objectives is to cause a cessation of business between neutrals, the
Baldovin court cited NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, 447 U.S. 607 (1980), for the
proposition that secondary picketing violates § 8(b)(4)(B) when it predictably encourages
consumers to cease patronizing the neutral employer's business altogether. 626 F.2d at 449.
See infra text accompanying notes 92-98. Thus, the court found, in accord with the Allied
decision (see infra notes 140-153 and accompanying text), that the ILA boycott was a secon-
dary boycott within the NLRA prohibition. Id
58. Id at 453. In Walsh, 630 F.2d 864 (lst Cir. 1980), the First Circuit concluded that
Baldovin had preclusive effect over the NLRB's petition for a section 10(1) injunction. Id at
867. Walsh resulted from the unfair labor practice charge filed with the NLRB by Allied
against the ILA. NLRB Regional Director, Michael F. Walsh, petitioned the Untied States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts for a § 10(1) injunction pending the NLRB's
resolution of Allied's unfair labor practice charge. Id at 866-67. The district court deter-
mined that it was not bound by the prior district court decision in Baldovin. 488 F. Supp.
524, 528 (D. Mass. 1980). The court held that the doctrines of issue preclusion, res judicata
and collateral estoppel by judgment, were inapplicable to § I0(1) petitions. Thus, the court
declined to follow Baldovin and concluded that the controversy was within the commerce
jurisdiction of the NLRA. Id However, because the court found that the ILA activity was a
primary boycott exempted from § 8(b)(4), it denied the injunction. Id at 530-31. On ap-
peal, the First Circuit upheld the district court's denial of the § 10(l) injunction but on the
ground that the action was barred by the decision of the district court in Baldovin, i.e., that
the NLRB lacked jurisdiction because the controversy was not "in commerce." 630 F.2d at
875.
59. American Radio Ass'n v. Mobile S.S. Ass'n, 419 U.S. 215 (1974); Windward Ship-
ping (London) Ltd. v. American Radio Ass'n, 415 U.S. 104 (1974); International Longshore-
men's Local 1416 v. Ariadne Shipping Ltd., 397 U.S. 195 (1970); Incres S.S. Co. v.
International Maritime Workers Union, 372 U.S. 24 (1963); McCulloch v. Sociedad Na-
cional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963); and Benz v. Compania Naviera Hi-
dalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138 (1957).
60. 353 U.S. 138 (1957).
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bor disputes between foreign employers and their foreign employees.
Benz involved picketing by three American unions against a foreign
vessel in support of a strike by its foreign crew against their employer, a
foreign shipowner.6 The foreign employer sought damages in federal
court under the NLRA.62 The Court held that the controversy was
outside the jurisdictional scope of the NLRA because the United States
labor laws were not intended to govern labor disputes between foreign
nationals arising under foreign laws.63 The Benz Court relied upon the
legislative history of the NLRA to determine that Congress intended
the NLRA to govern only labor strife between American employers
and employees.' In addition, the Benz Court recognized the strong
likelihood that assertion of NLRB jurisdiction in this setting would
promote international discord because it would directly interfere with
the laws governing foreign-flag carriers and thus contravene principles
of comity in international trade. Consequently, the Court held that
the controversy was outside the jurisdictional scope of the NLRA and
deferred to Congress the task of determining American policy in such a
"delicate field of international relations. 66
61. Id. at 139-41.
62. Id at 138-39.
63. Id at 143. The foreign seamen were employed under a British form of articles of
agreement setting forth employment terms. Id at 139.
64. Id at 142-44. The Court noted the statement of Representative Hartley, coauthor of
the Labor-Management Relations Act, that "'the bill herewith reported has been formu-
lated as a bill of rights both forAmerican workingmen and for their employers."' Id at 144
(emphasis added) (quoting H.R. RaP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1947). Thus, the
Court concluded that "Congress did not fashion. . .[the NLRA] to resolve labor disputes
between [foreign] nationals . . . . mhe Act is concerned with industrial strife between
American employers and employees." 353 U.S. at 143-44 (footnote omitted).,
65. Id at 146-47.
66. Id at 147. The Court stated:
For us to run interference in such a delicate field of international relations there
must be present the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed. It
alone has the facilities necessary to make fairly such an important policy decision
where the possibilities of international discord are so evident and retaliative action
so certain.
Id The41lied Court noted that a similar analysis was followed six years later in McCulloch
v. Sociedad National de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963), and Incres Steamship
Co. v. International Maritime Workers Union, 372 U.S. 24 (1963). 456 U.S. at 220 n.16. In
MeCulloch, an American union petitioned the NLRB to order an election aboard a foreign
vessel to determine union representation of foreign seamen employed by a foreign ship-
owner. 372 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1963). In Incres, foreign shipowners sought injunctive relief
under the NLRA from organizational picketing by an American union seeking to represent
foreign seamen aboard a foreign vessel. 372 U.S. 24, 26 (1963). In both cases, the Supreme
Court held that the controversy was outside the jurisdictional scope of the NLRA because
"maritime operations of foreign-flag ships employing alien seamen are not in 'commerce'
within the meaning of [the NLRA]." Id at 27; MeCulloch, 372 U.S. at 13. The Court fo-
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The Court's application of the Benz rationale in Windward Sh v-
ping (London) Limited v. American Radio Association6 7 and its compan-
ion case, American Radio Association v. Mobile Steamshp Association,
Inc. ,68 established that when assertion of jurisdiction over union con-
duct interferes in the realm of international affairs, it is immaterial to
resolution of the commerce jurisdiction issue whether the union's con-
duct is characterized as "primary" or "secondary." In Windward,
American unions picketed foreign vessels to protest low wages paid for-
eign seamen by foreign shipowners and to publicize the adverse impact
of these low wages on American seamen.6 9 The Court found that be-
cause the unions' picketing sought to force the foreign shipowners to
pay their foreign crews higher wages and thus raise the operating costs
of the foreign vessels, it had a significant impact on the maritime opera-
tions of the foreign vessels.70 Therefore, the Court held that the unions'
conduct was controlled by the Benz rationale and thus was not within
the commerce jurisdiction of the NLRA.71
The secondary effects of the conduct at issue in Windward came
before the Court in Mobile. In Mobile, American stevedores and ship-
pers employed to service the picketed foreign vessels in Windward
sought injunctive relief from the unions' picketing.72 They contended
that the Windward Court held only that maritime operations of foreign
vessels were not "in commerce" and that a different result was required
when picketing was viewed in the context of its effect on American
employers clearly engaged "in commerce. ' 73 The Mobile Court re-
cused on the degree of intrusion into the "internal management and affairs of [foreign] ves-
sels" which assertion of jurisdiction would entail and concluded that Congress did not
intend the NLRA to have such far-reaching effects in the field of international relations.
McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 20-21; Incres, 372 U.S. at 27-28.
67. 415 U.S. 104 (1974).
68. 419 U.S. 215 (1974). International Longshoremen's Local 1416 v. Ariadne Shipping
Co., 397 U.S. 195 (1970), is the only case in the Benz series in which the Court held that the
controversy was within the commerce jurisdiction of the NLRA. Id at 200. InAriadne, an
American union picketed a foreign-owned vessel to protest substandard wages paid Ameri-
can longshoremen by foreign shipowners. Id at 196. Accordingly, the Court concluded that
application of the NLRA to the controversy "threatened no interference in the internal af-
fairs of foreign-flag ships likely to lead to conflict with foreign or international law." Id at
200. Consequently, the union's picketing was held to be within the commerce jurisdiction of
the NLRA. Id
69. 415 U.S. at 106-07. The difference between foreign and domestic seamen's wages
gave foreign vessels a substantial competitive advantage over domestic vessels which re-
sulted in a decline in the number of jobs available to union members. Id
70. Id at 114-15.
71. Id at 115.
72. 419 U.S. at 220.
73. Id at 221-22. The Court noted the fundamental inconsistency between the unions'
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jected this argument and determined that the Benz line of cases did not
allow a "bifurcated view of the effects of a single group of pickets
.... "74 Accordingly, the Court held that the change in complainants
did not alter the jurisdictional reach of the NLRA and therefore, as in
Windward, the unions' picketing was not in commerce and thus not
governed by the NLRA.75
The determination in Mobile that the picketing was not "in com-
merce" rested upon the primary nature of the activity--the attempt to
directly pressure foreign shipowners to raise the wages paid their
seamen-and the necessary effect of this primary activity on foreign
maritime operations. Therefore, the combined effect of the holdings in
Windward and Mobile is that primary conduct which interferes with
foreign maritime operations is not within the commerce jurisdiction of
the NLRA, regardless of whether the complainant is a primary or sec-
ondary employer.
2. Secondary boycott
Due to the "chameleon-like qualities of the term 'secondary boy-
cott,' "76 the Supreme Court has relied upon the legislative history and
purpose of section 8(b)(4)(B) to determine whether union activity con-
stitutes a prohibited secondary boycott.7 7 From its analysis of the legis-
lative history of section 8(b)(4)(B), the Court has determined that
Congress intended section 8(b)(4)(B) to shield neutral employers and
others from pressures in controversies not their own 78 by prohibiting
union conduct "tactically calculated to satisfy union objectives
elsewhere."
79
Because the term "secondary boycott" does not appear in section
8(b)(4)(B), the Court has recognized that its prohibitions donot recog-
argument in Windward that their picketing was primary activity protected by the NLRA and
their argument in Mobile that the picketing was a secondary boycott prohibited by the
NLRA. Id at 220.
74. Id at 222.
75. Id at 225. The Court stated that:
The effect of the picketing on the operations of the stevedores and shippers, and
thence on these maritime operations, is precisely the same whether it be com-
plained of by the foreign-ship owners or by persons seeking to service and deal
with the ships. The fact that the jurisdiction of the state courts in this case is in-
yoked by stevedores and shippers does not convert into "commerce" activities
which plainly were not such in Windward.
Id
76. National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 623 (1967).
77. See supra notes 25-44 and accompanying text.
78. NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951).
79. National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n, 386 U.S. at 644.
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nize a distinction between primary and secondary activity."0 Instead,
the Court has interpreted section 8(b)(4)(B) to proscribe specific union
conduct engaged in with specific objectives which experience has
shown to be undesirable.8'
The Supreme Court has described the elements of a prohibited
secondary boycott as follows: "Employees must be induced; they must
be induced to engage in a strike or concerted refusal; an object must be
to force or require their employer or another person to cease doing
business with a third person.""2 Furthermore, the Court has stated that
it is not necessary to find that the sole object of a union's strike or
boycott is to cause a cessation of business between neutral parties; the
objective prohibited by section 8(b)(4)(B) need only be an object of
union activity.83 Recognizing the difficulty of assessing the object of
union conduct under section 8(b)(4),84 the Court has held that a union's
intent or purpose may be shown by the nature of its conduct.8 5
In NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760 ("Tree Fruits"), 6
the Court held that union secondary product picketing targeted at one
of many products sold by a secondary employer does not violate sec-
tion 8(b)(4)(B).87 In Tree Fruits, a union picketed Safeway stores to
induce customers not to purchase Washington State apples because of a
labor dispute between the union and fruit packers and warehousemen
in Washington. 8   The picketing was carefully limited to the struck
product, Washington State apples, which was "only one of numerous
food products sold in the [Safeway] stores." 89 Noting that "the prohibi-
tion of § 8(b)(4) is keyed to the coercive nature of the [union's] con-
duct,"90 the Court held that the union's picketing did not coerce neutral
80. See supra note 2.
81. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 62-63 (1964),
82. Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 98 (1958).
83. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. at 688-89. Section 8(b)(4)(B) pro-
hibits specified union activities where "an object thereof' is one of the specified results. 29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976) (emphasis added). See supra note 2 for text of statute.
84. Local 761, Int'l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 674
(1961) (to determine object of union conduct under § 8(b)(4)(B), the NLRB and the courts
have "attempted to devise reasonable criteria drawing heavily upon the means to which a
union resorts in promoting its cause.").
85. Id See also NLRB v. Local 825, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 400 U.S. 297, 304-
05 (1971) (union responsible for foreseeable consequences of its conduct).
86. 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
87. Id at 72-73.
88. Id at 59-60.
89. Id at 60.
90. Id at 68.
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parties and therefore did not violate section 8(b)(4)(B). 91
On the other hand, in NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union Lo-
cal 1001,92 the Court held that the kind of union conduct which vio-
lates section 8(b)(4)(B) is conduct "that reasonably can be expected to
threaten neutral parties with ruin or substantial loss . . . . The
Court also provided a guideline to aid lower courts in determining
what constitutes "ruin or substantial loss." In Retail Store Employees, a
union which represented employees of Safeco Title Insurance Co., a
title insurance underwriter, picketed five title companies, asking cus-
tomers to cancel their Safeco policies because contract negotiations be-
tween the union and Safeco had reached an impasse.94 The Court
determined that, because the picketed title companies derived over
ninety percent of their gross income from the sale of Safeco policies95
and because the union's picketing effectively asked customers to cease
patronizing the title companies altogether, the title companies were
forced to become involved in the primary dispute between the union
and Safeco by the threat of financial ruin.96 Therefore, the Court held
that the union's product picketing contravened the intent of section
8(b)(4)(B) "to protect secondary parties from pressures that might em-
broil them in the labor disputes of others"9 7 and thus constituted a
prohibited secondary boycott.98
At the time Allied was decided by the Supreme Court, the lower
courts were generally in agreement that the absence of a primary labor
dispute does not preclude a finding that section 8(b)(4)(B) has been
violated.99 The courts, however, disagreed as to whether the NLRB
91. Id at 72-73.
92. 447 U.S. 607 (1980).
93. Id at 614-15.
94. Id at 609-10.
95. Id at 609.
96. Id at 613-14.
97. Id at 612.
98. Id at 615.
99. Title 29 U.S.C. § 152(9) (1976) defines the term "labor dispute" to include "any con-
troversy concerning terms, tenure or conditions of employment, or concerning the associa-
tion or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to
arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in
the proximate relation of employer and employee."
In Soft Drink Workers Union, Local 812 v. NLRB, 657 F.2d 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1980), the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals held that § 8(b)(4)(B) is applicable even when
there is no primary labor dispute to which the union conduct could be secondary. Id at
1259. In Soft Drink Workers, a union picketed a retail beverage store asking customers to
purchase only locally manufactured soft drinks. Id at 1255-56. Finding a violation of
§ 8(b)(4)(B), the NLRB issued a cease and desist order against the union. Id at 1256-57.
The court rejected the union's argument that, because there was no conventional labor dis-
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may exercise jurisdiction absent a labor dispute as defined by section
2(9) of the NLRA.' °
3. First amendment
The first amendment' 0 ' guarantee of free speech applies to unions
as well as individuals.102 However, the Supreme Court has held con-
sistently that conduct made unlawful by legitimate legislation is not
protected by the first amendment.1 0 3 Therefore, in International Broth-
erhood of Electrical Workers v. NLRB, " 4 the Supreme Court held that
"[t]he [NLRA] prohibition of inducement or encouragement of secon-
dary pressure . . . carries no unconstitutional abridgment of free
speech." ' Thus, before Allied, the Court had determined that because
pute, the NLRB lacked jurisdiction to issue the order. Id at 1258. In addition, the court
concluded that a primary labor dispute need not be identified to find a violation of section
8(b)(4)(B). Id at 1259. Accord National Maritime Union v. NLRB, 346 F.2d 411,417 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 840 (1965).
100. NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 332 F.2d 992, 995 (4th Cir. 1964)
(NLRB lacked jurisdiction to enjoin union boycott because "there can be no [NLRB] juris-
diction where the complaint presents a controversy unrelated to the resolution of a 'labor
dispute' as defined [by § 2(9) of the NLRA]."). Accord United States Steel Corp. v. UMW,
519 F.2d 1236, 1247-48 (5th Cir. 1975) (union strike to protest importation of South African
coal was an unarbitrable political dispute and therefore not exempt from Norris-LaGuardia
Act), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910 (1976); Danielson v. Fur Dressers, Local No. 2F, 411 F.
Supp. 655, 657-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (NLRB petition to enjoin union picketing of fur proces-
sor which, in compliance with requirements of foreign governments, imported only
processed skins, denied because no labor dispute or because protected primary picketing);
Douds v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local Union No. 28, 101 F. Supp. 273, 278-79
(E.D.N.Y. 1951) (no secondary boycott in absence of primary labor dispute between union
and heating company). Cf. Baldovin v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 626 F.2d 445,
450 (5th Cir. 1980) (union refusal to load grain bound for Soviet Union to protest Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan was secondary boycott despite absence of primary labor dispute);
National Maritime Union v. NLRB, 346 F.2d 411, 414-15 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (NLRB empow-
ered to enjoin union's conduct in dispute with rival union despite the absence of conven-
tional labor dispute), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 840 (1965); National Maritime Union v. NLRB,
342 F.2d 538, 541-42 (2d Cir. 1965) (union picketing to induce work stoppages among em-
ployees of secondary employers constituted a secondary boycott even though picketing was
a retaliative measure against rival union rather than a conventional labor dispute), cert. de-
nied, 382 U.S. 835 (1966).
101. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom of
speech. ... ).
102. See NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607 (1980).
103. American Radio Ass'n v. Mobile S.S. Ass'n, 419 U.S. 215, 228-32 (1974); Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957); Carpenters Union,
Local No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942). The constitutionality of the NLRA was
established in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
104. 341 U.S. 694 (1951).
105. Id at 705.
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secondary boycotts are illegal under the NLRA, they are not protected
by the first amendment.
IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
The threshold issue for the Allied Court was jurisdictional in na-
ture: whether the ILA's work stoppage was within the scope of the
NLRA, i.e., whether it affected commerce. The Court began its analy-
sis of the commerce jurisdiction issue by interpreting the language of
section 8(b)(4). The Court reasoned that because Allied, Waterman
and Clark were engaged "in commerce," the ILA's action "affected
commerce" within the statutory definitions."°6 Consequently, a literal
interpretation of the statutory language invoked the commerce jurisdic-
tion of the NLRA.
In addition, the Court rejected the ILA's contention that its action
was not "in commerce" as the Court had previously interpreted that
term.107 The Court distinguished Benz and its progeny,' 0 8 determining
that the ILA's work stoppage did not affect the maritime operations of
foreign vessels. The Court reasoned that, by refusing to handle Soviet
goods, the ILA did not attempt to alter the terms of employment for
foreign seamen aboard foreign ships and did not seek to extend to for-
eign seamen and shipowners rights given American employees and em-
ployers by the NLRA. Moreover, this "drama was 'played out by an
all-American cast'" and involved no dispute with a foreign employer.
Consequently, the Court reasoned that the international trade policy
considerations prevalent in the Benz cases were irrelevant in Allied. As
a result, the Court held that the ILA conduct did not fall within the
Benz limitation of NLRA commerce jurisdiction and therefore was
governed by the NLRA.1°9
By analyzing the language and legislative intent of section
8(b)(4)(B), theAllied Court held that the ILA's refusal to handle Soviet
cargo constituted a prohibited secondary boycott.'10 Section 8(b)(4)(B)
prohibits union conduct where "an object thereof' is forcing any per-
son to cease doing business with another person."' As a result, the
Court's method of analysis required it to find that one of the objects of
106. 456 U.S. at 221-22. See supra note 2 for text of statutes.
107. Id at 221.
108. See supra notes 59-75 and accompanying text.
109. 456 U.S. at 221-22.
110. Id at 222-26. "By its terms the statutory prohibition applies to the undisputed facts
of this case." Id at 22. See supra note 2 for text of section 8(b)(4)(B). For a discussion of
the relevant legislative history, see notes 25-44 and accompanying text.
111. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1976). See supra note 2 for text of statute.
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the ILA's action was to disrupt business among Allied, Waterman and
Clark. To make this determination, the Court focused on the foresee-
able economic effects of the ILA's action'1 2 and stated that "when a
purely secondary boycott 'reasonably can be expected to threaten neu-
tral parties with ruin or substantial loss' the pressure on secondary par-
ties must be viewed as at least one of the objects of the boycott
... "1 However "understandable" and "commendable" the ILA's
ultimate objective of protesting Soviet military aggression in Afghani-
stan might have been, the predictable result of the ILA's action was to
threaten Allied, Waterman and Clark with financial ruin or substantial
loss. Therefore, the Court held that the disruption of their business was
"an object" of the ILA's action." 4
The Court rejected the ILA's argument that section 8(b)(4) was
inapplicable because the ILA boycott involved a political dispute with
a foreign nation rather than a labor dispute with a primary em-
ployer." 5 The Court recognized that the ILA sought no labor objective
from, nor had any labor dispute with, Allied, Waterman, or Clark and
that the ILA refusal to unload Soviet cargo was entirely politically mo-
tivated." 6 The Supreme Court, however, declined to limit the applica-
tion of section 8(b)(4)(B) to secondary boycotts involving labor
disputes,' and instead held that Congress had purposefully given sec-
tion 8(b)(4)(B) a broad scope to protect neutral parties from economic
pressure resulting from the disputes of others."'
112. 456 U.S. at 224.
113. Id (citing NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, 447 U.S. 607, 614-15 (1980)
("Product picketing that reasonably can be expected to threaten neutral parties with ruin or
substantial loss simply does not square with the language or the purpose of
§ 8(b)(4)(ii)(B).")). The Court characterized the ILA's boycott as purely secondary activity
because the boycott was directed against Allied's goods even though the ILA conceded it
sought no labor objective from, nor had any dispute with Allied, Waterman or Clark. The
boycott was designed to protest Soviet foreign policy and thus was clearly calculated to
achieve union objectives elsewhere. 456 U.S. at 222 n.19.
114. Id at 224.
115. Id at 224-25.
116. Id at 222-25. The Allied Court's reasoning parallels the Fifth Circuit's analysis of
the labor dispute jurisdiction issue. In New Orleans S.S. Ass'n v. General Longshore Work-
ers, 626 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1980), the Fifth Circuit determined that "a strike called to further
the political goals of the union" does not involve a labor dispute. Id at 465. Upholding two
injunctions issued by district courts against the ILA, id at 458, the court found that because
the ILA boycott did not "involve or grow out of any labor dispute," the anti-injunction
provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act were inapplicable. Id at 464-65.
117. 456 U.S. at 224-25.
118. Id (citing H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 23 (1947) (secondary boycott
prohibition designed to protect "helpless victims of quarrels that do not concern them at
all.")). The Court also noted that Congress had refused to narrow the socpe of section
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In addition, the Court declined to exclude politically-motivated
secondary boycotts from the scope of section 8(b)(4), noting that to do
so would create a "far-reaching exemption" from a statute purposely
drafted in broad terms.119 The Court further noted that section 8(b)(4)
contains no exception for political disputes. 120
The Allied Court held that application of section 8(b)(4)(B) to the
ILA's boycott of Soviet cargo would not violate the first amendment
rights of either the ILA or its members.12 The Court reiterated its
position that secondary picketing by labor unions in violation of sec-
tion 8(b)(4) is not protected activity under the first amendment.
22
Therefore, "[i]t would seem even clearer that conduct designed not to
8(b)(4)(B) in response to a claim that all secondary boycotts were not harmful. 456 U.S. at
225 n.23.
119. 456 U.S. at 226. Recognizing that the "distinction between labor and political objec-
fives would be difficult to draw in many cases," the Court was apparently concerned that, if
political disputes were exempted from section 8(b)(4), a union could engage in secondary
activity and escape sanctions simply by proclaiming that its activity was a political protest.
Id See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
120. 456 U.S. at 226.
121. Id The Fifth Circuit had reached the same conclusion in New Orleans S.S. Ass'n v.
General Longshore Workers, 626 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1980). In New Orleans, the court recog-
nized that, although first amendment guarantees extend to labor unions, union conduct
made unlawful by legislation enacted for purposes other than to suppress free expression is
not protected by the first amendment. 626 F.2d at 462-63. Therefore, because the ILA's
boycott violated the arbitration provisions of the NLRA, it was not protected by the first
amendment. Id at 463.
122. 456 U.S. at 226 (citing NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001, 447
U.S. 607, 616 (1980); American Radio Ass'n v. Mobile S.S. Ass'n, 419 U.S. 215, 229-31
(1974); International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694, 705 (1951)). The cases
cited by the Court stand for the proposition that union conduct which violates section
8(b)(4)(B) is not protected by the first amendment. In Retail Store Employees, the Court
held that section 8(b)(4)(B) does not abridge constitutionally-protected speech when applied
to "picketing that predictably encourages consumers to boycott a secondary business ..
447 U.S. at 616. See supra text accompanying notes 92-98.
The Mobile Court held that a state injunction of union picketing did not violate the first
amendment because states are allowed wide discretion in "protecting various competing
economic and social interests." 419 U.S. at 229. In Mobile, the state enjoined union picket-
ing of foreign ships designed to protest substandard wages paid foreign seamen and to publi-
cize the adverse impact of these wages on American seamen. Id at 217. The Court found
that the state's injunction was supported by a "valid public policy" in favor of preventing
wrongful interference in business and consequently did not violate the first amendment. Id
at 230-32. However, because the Court held that the union's conduct was outside the com-
merce jurisdiction of the NLRA, it did not address the issue of whether the union's conduct
was prohibited by section 8(b)(4)(B); nor did it decide whether prohibiting such conduct
under section 8(b)(4)(B) would violate the first amendment. See supra notes 72-75 and ac-
companying text.
In Electrical Workers, the Court held that peaceful union picketing was not protected
by the first amendment because its object was prohibited by section 8(b)(4)(A). 341 U.S. at
705. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
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communicate but to coerce merits still less consideration under the
First Amendment."' 23 Moreover, noting that the labor laws reflect a
balancing of interests,'2 4 the Court concluded that the ILA and its
members could express their political views regarding Soviet foreign
policy in other ways which would not infringe upon the rights of
others.
25
V. ANALYSIS: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ALLIED
A. Commerce Jurisdiction: Object or Effect?
To determine that the ILA boycott was within the commerce juris-
diction of the NLRA, the Court focused on the domestic effects of the
ILA's action-interference with contractual relationships-rather than
its foreign objective-to protest Soviet foreign policy in Afghanistan. 1
2 6
Thus, although the Allied Court claimed that it was "[a]pplying the
principles developed in. . . [the Benz line of] cases,"'12 7 it actually de-
parted from the Benz analysis, 128 which emphasized the objective
sought by the union to determine whether the union's conduct was
within the commerce jurisdiction of the NLRA.' 29 Consequently, it is
123. 456 U.S. at 226 (citing NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers ("Tree Fruits"), 377 U.S.
58 (1964)). The Court apparently recognized that section 8(b)(4) does not prohibit all secon-
dary activity by unions but only certain secondary activities designed to achieve specific
prohibited objectives.
The Tree Fruits Court noted that "a broad ban against peaceful picketing might collide
with the guarantees of the First Amendment." 377 U.S. at 63. In Tree Fruits, a union in-
volved in a labor dispute with employers of fruit packers and warehousemen in Washington
picketed retail stores which sold Washington State apples packaged by the primary employ-
ers. The picketing was limited to asking customers of the retail stores not to buy Washing-
ton State apples. The Court held that the union's conduct did not violate section 8(b)(4)
because it was directed only at the struck product and did not ask customers to cease dealing
with the retail stores altogether. Id at 71-72. Therefore, the union's conduct did not coerce
neutral parties to become involved in the primary dispute. Id at 68. The Court stated that
"the prohibition of § 8(b)(4) is keyed to the coercive nature of the [union's] conduct, whether
it be picketing or otherwise." Id Consequently, non-coercive secondary activity is not pro-
hibited by section 8(b)(4)(B) and is protected by the first amendment.
124. Id (citing NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607, 617
(1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring)). Justice Blackmun concurred in the result in Retail Store
Employees because he was reluctant "to hold unconstitutional Congress' striking of the deli-
cate balance between union freedom of expression and the ability of neutral employers,
employees, and consumers to remain free from coerced participation in industrial strife."
447 U.S. at 617-18.
125. 456 U.S. at 227.
126. Id at 222-23.
127. Id at 221.
128. See supra notes 59-75 and accompanying text.
129. Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138 (1957) (object of union's picketing
was representation of foreign seamen aboard foreign vessel); McCulloch v. Sociedad Na-
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unclear whether theAllied Court (1) implicitly overruled the Benz "ob-
ject" approach; (2) reaffirmed the object approach but limited its appli-
cation to situations which involve the maritime operations of foreign
vessels; or (3) adopted the bifurcated view rejected in Mobile,13 thus
implicitly overruling that decision and permitting courts to focus on
effects in unfair labor practice cases and objectives in all other
situations.
Although the Allied decision created some uncertainty as to when
the Court will focus on the objective rather than on the effects of union
activity involving foreign entities to determine whether commerce ju-
risdiction exists, the Allied Court's focus on the effects of the ILA's ac-
tion was nevertheless appropriate because Allied involved no primary
dispute that affected the rights of foreign entities. 3 ' In each of the
Benz cases, with the exception of Mobile, foreign primary employers
(the foreign shipowners) sought relief under the NLRA from primary
union conduct. 32 In Mobile, secondary domestic employers sought in-
junctive relief from primary union conduct directed against foreign en-
tities.1 33  Assertion of jurisdiction under the NLRA would have
required the Court in these cases to determine the rights of foreign enti-
ties under domestic law, thus interfering in the area of foreign relations.
In contrast, the domestic secondary employers in Allied sought dam-
ages under the NLRA for purely secondary union conduct. 34 Asser-
tion of jurisdiction required the Court to determine only the rights of
domestic entities, resulting in no interference in foreign relations. 35
The United States Constitution specifically gives Congress and the
cional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963) (union's objective was to conduct
representation election aboard foreign vessel employing foreign seamen); Incres S.S. Co. v.
International Maritime Workers Union, 372 U.S. 24 (1963) (union's objective to conduct
representation election among foreign seamen aboard foreign vessel); International Long-
shoremen's Local 1416 v. Ariadne Shipping Ltd., 397 U.S. 195 (1970) (union's objective to
increase wages paid American longshoremen by foreign shipowners); Windward Shipping
(London) Ltd. v. American Radio Ass'n, 415 U.S. 104 (1974) (union's objective to publicize
adverse effects on American seamen of substandard wages paid foreign seamen); American
Radio Ass'n v. Mobile S.S. Ass'n, 419 U.S. 215 (1974) (same objective as in Windward). See
supra notes 59-75 and accompanying text for discussion of Court's reasoning in each of
these cases.
130. See supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
131. "[It is not even arguable that Allied was feeling the secondary effects of aprimary
dispute protected by the Act." 456 U.S. at 224 n.22 (emphasis in original).
132. See supra notes 59-75 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
134. 456 U.S. at 224.
135. The Court stated that "Ithe longstanding tradition of restraint in applying the laws
of this country to ships of a foreign country. . . is irrelevant to this case." Id at 221.
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President concurrent power over international affairs.1 36 Thus, when
foreign relations would be affected directly by determining the rights of
foreign entities under federal labor laws, as was the case in Benz and its
progeny, it is more appropriate for the Court to use the object approach
to the commerce jurisdiction issue. Otherwise, the Court would exceed
the scope of its power under the Constitution by exercising a power
reserved to Congress and the President. When, however, the determi-
nation of rights under the federal labor laws threatens no interference
in the realm of foreign affairs, as was the case inAllied, it is appropriate
for the Court to analyze the effects of union conduct to determine
whether or not the conduct is in commerce. In this situation, the
Court's assertion of jurisdiction does not exceed its constitutionally
granted power.
The Allied Court's focus on the effects of the ILA's action rather
than on its foreign objective was appropriate because a secondary boy-
cott allegation was at issue. Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the NLRA prohibits
union conduct which furthers union goals in a dispute with one em-
ployer while adversely affecting another employer.1 37 Thus, section
8(b)(4)(B) is designed to shield neutral secondary employers from the
adverse effects of union activity in disputes in which the secondary em-
ployer is not otherwise involved. 38 Because section 8(b)(4)(B) is con-
cerned with the secondary effects of union conduct, it would be
anomalous for the Court to focus exclusively on the object of the pri-
mary dispute to determine the commerce jurisdiction issue and disre-
gard the secondary effects of that dispute which section 8(b)(4)(B)
specifically prohibits. To accomplish the purpose of section 8(b)(4)(B),
the Court must consider how and in what degree a secondary employer
is affected by union conduct. Therefore, the object of the primary dis-
pute should not be dispositive of the commerce jurisdiction issue in the
context of a section 8(b)(4)(B) action.
Furthermore, in secondary boycott situations involving foreign en-
tities, strict adherence to the "object" approach to resolve the com-
merce jurisdiction issue could potentially undermine the purpose of
section 8(b)(4)(B)-to prevent neutral secondary employers from bear-
ing the economic burdens of the disputes of others. InAllied, the object
of the ILA's conduct-Soviet military policy in Afghanistan-was ar-
guably not in commerce within the meaning of the NLRA. 139 If only
136. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2.
137. See supra note 2.
138. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
139. 456 U.S. at 222-23.
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the object of the union's conduct were considered in resolving the com-
merce jurisdiction issue, the ILA's conduct would probably fall outside
the commerce jurisdiction of the NLRA and section 8(b)(4)(B) would
not be applicable. The result would be that injured secondary employ-
ers would be barred from recovering under the NLRA.
Carrying the "object" analysis to its extreme, a union could cir-
cumvent the secondary boycott provisions of the NLRA and engage in
otherwise prohibited secondary activity by claiming that its action was
a political protest against the policies and/or actions of a foreign na-
tion. For example, to protest the imposition of martial law in Poland,
the plumber's union might have refused to install a particular brand of
pipe because it was made from copper mined in Poland. The object of
the union's conduct would have been to protest Polish military policy.
Therefore, even though American manufacturers, wholesalers, and re-
tailers of that brand of pipe would have been injured by the union's
action, the "object" analysis would deny them recovery under section
8(b)(4)(B) because the union's object was not "in commerce." Because
the United States engages in a large volume of trade with numerous
foreign countries, great potential exists for unions to undermine the
purpose of section 8(b)(4)(B) by claiming to have political disputes with
foreign nations. Therefore, because a secondary boycott allegation was
at issue inAllied, the Court properly focused on the effects of the ILA's
action to resolve the commerce jurisdiction issue.
B. Secondary Boycott
1. Ruin or substantial loss: how forseeable?
The Court's conclusion that the ILA's action was prohibited by
section 8(b)(4)(B) rested on its finding that the cessation of business
between Allied, Waterman and Clark was an object of the ILA's ac-
tion. 4° To make this determination, the Court applied the standard set
forth in NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union Local 1001,141 which
established that union activity violates section 8(b)(4)(B) if it "reason-
ably can be expected to threaten neutral parties with ruin or substantial
loss." '142 Thus, Allied stands for the proposition that when union con-
duct foreseeably threatens neutral parties with financial ruin or sub-
stantial loss, that effect is an object of the union's conduct prohibited by
section 8(b)(4)(B).
140. Id at 224. See supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
141. 447 U.S. 607 (1980). See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
142. Id. at 614.
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TheAllied Court extended the applicability of the Retail Store Em-
ployees "ruin or substantial loss" test in the area of secondary boycotts.
Retail Store Employees involved secondary product picketing, i.e.,
union picketing designed to persuade customers of a secondary em-
ployer not to purchase a product sold by the secondary employer be-
cause that product is manufactured by an employer with whom the
union has a dispute.1 43 Allied, however, did not involve secondary
product picketing. The ILA did not actually picket Allied, nor did it
ask Allied's customers not to purchase Soviet products. Instead, the
ILA simply refused to handle Soviet goods.'" Because the Court did
not distinguish the union conduct at issue in Retail Store Employees
from that in Allied, it appears that the Court does not intend the Retail
Store Employees test to be confined to secondary product picketing
cases, but intends it to have a broader application.
Moreover, theAllied Court employed the "ruin or substantial loss"
test to determine both that the cessation of business between Allied,
Waterman and Clark was an object of the union's conduct and to deter-
mine that the ILA's conduct violated section 8(b)(4)(B). 145 However, in
Retail Store Employees, the Court held that the union's picketing vio-
lated section 8(b)(4)(B) because it threatened the secondary employers
with ruin or substantial loss.' 46 Thus, after Allied, the "ruin or substan-
tial loss" test is applicable to determine not only whether union con-
duct violates section 8(b)(4)(B), but also to determine what objective is
sought by a union secondary boycott. As a result, the "ruin or substan-
tial loss" test may now apply in all secondary boycott situations.
The Allied Court's holding narrowed only slightly the parameters
of the "ruin or substantial loss" test as defined by Retail Store Employ-
ees and Tree Fruits. Retail Store Employees established that when the
secondary employer derives ninety percent or more of its income from
sales of a struck product, secondary product picketing threatens neu-
trals with ruin or substantial loss. 147 In Retail Store Employees, the
secondary employers (the title companies which sold Safeco insurance
143. See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
145. 456 U.S. at 224. See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
146. 447 U.S. at 615. See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text. Cf. Tree Fruits, 377
U.S. 58 (1964). See also supra text accompanying notes 86-91.
147. 447 U.S. at 609. See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text. The Court noted in
Retail Store Employees that "[i]f secondary picketing were directed against a product repre-
senting a major portion of a neutral's business, but significantly less than that represented by
a single dominant product, neither Tree Fruits nor today's decision necessarily would con-
trol." 447 U.S. at 615 n.ll.
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policies) derived ninety percent of their business from the sale of the
struck product (Safeco insurance policies).1 48 The Court found that the
union's product picketing threatened the secondary employers with
financial ruin because it effectively asked customers to cease patroniz-
ing them altogether. 149 Therefore, the Court held that the union's con-
duct was an illegal secondary boycott.' 50 Tree Fruits, on the other
hand, established that when the struck product is but one of many
products sold by the secondary employer, secondary product picketing
limited to the struck product does not coerce neutral parties and there-
fore does not violate section 8(b)(4)(B). 151
In holding that the ILA's action had the objective of causing a
cessation of business between the neutral secondary employers and
thus violated section 8(b)(4)(B), the Allied Court followed the reason-
ing of Retail Store Employees. Approximately eighty-five percent of
Allied's imports, amounting to twenty-five million dollars annually,
came from the Soviet Union. 152 Therefore, the Court held that the
ILA's refusal to handle those imports threatened Allied with ruin or
substantial loss.' 53 As a result, the holding in Allied moved the upper
limit of "ruin or substantial loss" from ninety percent or more of the
secondary employer's income to eighty-five percent or more of the sec-
ondary employer's income-not a substantial change. Consequently,
the holding inAllied contributed little to the definition of "ruin or sub-
stantial loss" which will render union conduct violative of section
8(b)(4)(B).
2. Nature of primary dispute irrelevant to
section 8(b)(4)(B) violation
The Allied Court's holding that section 8(b)(4)(B) is applicable
even in the absence of a primary labor dispute recognized the legisla-
tive purpose and intent of section 8(b)(4)(B). Section 8(b)(4)(B) was
drafted to prevent neutral parties from becoming the victims of contro-
versies in which they are not involved.1 54 To limit application of sec-
tion 8(b)(4)(B) to union secondary activity that involves only labor-
related primary disputes would destroy the protection Congress in-
148. 447 U.S. at 609.
149. Id at 614.
150. Id at 614-15.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 86-91. See also Soft Drink Workers Union v.
NLRB, 657 F.2d 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
152. 257 N.L.R.B. 1075, 1084 (1981).
153. 456 U.S. at 224.
154. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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tended to give neutral secondary employers. Such a limitation would
permit unions to engage in secondary activity and avoid the prohibition
of section 8(b)(4)(B) simply by claiming to have a primary dispute
which is not labor-oriented.
The potential danger for abuse by unions would be even greater if
political disputes were exempted from section 8(b)(4)(B). A union
could readily find some political justification for its conduct and thus
escape the prohibition of section 8(b)(4)(B).1 5  As a result, secondary
employers would lose the protection afforded them by section
8(b)(4)(B) and would have to endure secondary pressure simply be-
cause the union's action was politically motivated. As the Allied Court
noted, such a result would be contrary to both the language and pur-
pose of section 8(b)(4)(B).' 56
C First Amendment: Illegality v. Compelling Government Interest
To determine that enjoining the ILA boycott did not infringe upon
the ILA's freedom of speech, the Allied Court applied the established
principle that illegal activity is not protected by the first amendment.5 7
Thus, once the Court found that the ILA's conduct violated section
8(b)(4)(B),15 8 it summarily concluded that it was not protected activity
under the first amendment.' 59 The Court relied upon labor picketing
cases to determine that the ILA's boycott was illegal and thus not pro-
tected by the first amendment. 160 Allied, however, involved neither la-
bor picketing nor any labor controversy. Rather, to voice its opposition
to Soviet military policy in Afghanistan, the ILA simply declined to
handle Soviet goods. 6 ' Thus, the ILA's action did not entail the physi-
155. See supra text accompanying notes 37-39.
156. 456 U.S. at 224-25. In addition, the Court, agreeing with the court of appeals, stated
that:
[l]t is "more rather than less objectionable that a national labor union has chosen
to marshal against neutral parties the considerable powers derived by its locals and
itself under the federal labor laws in aid of a random political objective far re-
moved from what has traditionally been thought to be the realm of legitimate
union activity."
Id at 225-26 (quoting Allied, 640 F.2d at 1378).
157. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
158. 456 U.S. at 223-24. See supra notes 140-53 and accompanying text for analysis of
Court's reasoning.
159. 456 U.S. at 226.
160. Id ("We have consistently rejected the claim that secondary picketing by labor un-
ions in violation of § 8(b)(4) is protected activity under the First Amendment.") (citing
NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607 (1980) and American
Radio Ass'n v. Mobile S.S. Ass'n, 419 U.S. 215 (1974)).
161. 456 U.S. at 214-15.
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cal obstruction and/or intrusion ordinarily associated with picket
lines.'62 Therefore, the Court's reliance upon labor picketing cases to
determine the first amendment issue was inappropriate.
The Allied Court's summary resolution of the first amendment is-
sue failed to consider adequately the political motivation behind the
ILA's boycott. Assembling for the purpose of peaceful action is not
unlawful.'63 Moreover, political expression is the kind of speech most
jealously protected by the first amendment. 164 The ILA's action was
political expression by an organized group and thus constituted an ex-
ercise of the union members' right to associate to express political be-
liefs. The fact that the group expressing its political beliefs was a union
should have no bearing on whether the group's conduct was or was not
protected by the first amendment.
The Allied Court could have reached the conclusion that the ILA's
boycott was not protected activity under the first amendment by a dif-
ferent means less restrictive of first amendment rights. Incidental in-
fringement of first amendment rights may be justified if there exists a
compelling government interest.1 65 The NLRA was enacted to protect
and promote the free flow of commerce. 66 Section 8(b)(4) was specifi-
cally designed to prevent the spread of industrial strife. 6 Either or
both of these objectives may be considered sufficiently compelling to
justify infringement of the ILA's first amendment rights.
A balancing of interests would have been a sounder approach to
the first amendment issue than the Allied Court's analysis because it
would have considered the political motivation behind the ILA's boy-
cott. Moreover, it would not have required the Court to adopt the
somewhat strained analogy between the ILA's refusal to handle Soviet
goods and labor picketing.
162. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 289 (1957) ("'Pick-
eting by an organized group is more than free speech, since it involves patrol of a particular
locality and since the very presence of a picket line may induce action of one kind or an-
other, quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being disseminated.' ") (quoting
Bakery Drivers Local v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776 (1942) (concurring opinion))).
163. Vogt, 354 U.S. at 293 (citing Bldg. Serv. Employees v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 539
(1950)).
164. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,269 (1964) ("The general proposition
that freedom of expression upon public questions is secured by the First Amendment has
long been settled by our decisions.").
165. Police Dept. of the City of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972).
166. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 42-44.
1984]
LOYOL OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [
D. Procedural Distinctions." Another Facet of Russian
Boycott Litigation?
Although the dispute in Allied, like that in Baldovin v. International
Longshoremen'sAssociation,168 New Orleans S.S. Association v. General
Longshore Workers,'69 and Walsh v. International Longshoremen's As-
sociation,17° originated in the ILA's boycott of Russian goods, the pro-
cedural context in which Allied arose differed in several respects from
that in which the other three cases arose. Allied was an action between
private parties. Baldovin and Walsh were actions brought by the
NLRB. 171 In addition, Allied was an action for damages, whereas
Baldovin, New Orleans, and Walsh were each actions for injunctive re-
lief. 7 2 As a result of these differences, the jurisdiction of the NLRB
under section 10(a)' 73 and the procedural requirements of section
10(1) 174 were not at issue in Allied; nor were the anti-injunction provi-
sions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act."' Therefore, the Allied Court dis-
tinguished the issue addressed by the courts of appeals in Baldovin,
New Orleans and Walsh-the jurisdiction of the NLRB over union un-
fair labor practices under section 10(a) of the NLRA-from that
presented in Allied-the scope of the secondary boycott prohibition of
the NLRA. 76 Thus, the Court framed the issue in Allied narrowly-
determination of the scope of section 8(b)(4) in the setting of a boycott
of foreign goods.'77 The distinction drawn by the4llied Court can be
made only by reading the phrase "affecting commerce" which appears
in both sections 8(b)(4) and 10(a) of the NLRA as though it had a dif-
ferent meaning in each section. This seems a somewhat artificial dis-
168. 626 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1980).
169. 626 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1980), a fdsub nom, Jacksonville Bulk Term., Inc. v. Interna-
tional Longshoremen's Ass'n, 457 U.S. 702 (1982).
170. 630 F.2d 864 (1st Cir. 1980).
171. New Orleans, like.411ied, was an action between private parties. However, because
New Orleans involved the enforcement of arbitration awards, and thus the arbitration provi-
sions of the NLRA, it is factually distinguishable from Allied See New Orleans, 626 F.2d at
465.
172. See supra notes 45-58 and accompanying text for discussion of these cases.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 48-58.
174. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
176. 640 F.2d at 1371. InAllied, the Supreme Court stated that it "granted certiorari to
determine the coverage of the secondary boycott provisions of the National Labor Relations
Act in this setting." 456 U.S. at 218 (emphasis added). The court of appeals in Allied Int'l
Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 640 F.2d 1368 (lst Cir. 1981), stated that "this
case does not, as did Baldovin and Walsh, require consideration of the jurisdiction of the
National Labor Relations Board ... ." Id at 1371 (citations omitted).
177. 456 U.S. at 218. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
Vol. 17
SECONDARY BOYCOTTS
tinction: NLRB jurisdiction over unfair labor practices extends to
persons engaging in unfair labor practices "affecting commerce,"178
whereas the secondary boycott prohibition protects any person "en-
gaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce" from certain
union activities.
179
It is difficult to imagine a situation where a prohibited secondary
boycott would not affect commerce given that the victim of the secon-
dary boycott must be engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting
commerce to fall within the proscription. Moreover, the definitions of
the terms "commerce" and "affecting commerce" in section 2(6) and
(7)180 apply whenever those terms appear in the NLRA."s Therefore,
the distinction made by the Court in Allied is tenuous at best.
Because the Allied Court did not overrule Baldovin and because it
implicitly affirmed the lower court's narrow statement of the issue in
Allied, it is conceivable that Baldovin and Walsh still have preclusive
effect over section 10(1) injunctions in the context of a boycott of for-
eign goods.'3 2 The court of appeals inAllied held that the NLRA ap-
plied to the action brought by a private party against a union even
though the NLRB's jurisdiction over the unfair labor practice was
barred by res judicata.' s3 Therefore, it is an open question whether the
NLRB may enjoin this type of unfair labor practice even though it
would sustain a private damages remedy. From a practical standpoint,
it is unlikely that the Court would deny NLRB jurisdiction to enjoin a
secondary boycott while simultaneously granting private parties mone-
tary relief from the boycott. To do so would allow the boycott to con-
tinue and thus allow recoverable damages to increase unnecessarily.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court framed the issue presented in Allied narrowly-deter-
mination of the scope of section 8(b)(4) in the context of a politically-
motivated boycott of foreign goods. 8 4 The Court's opinion is carefully
tailored to address only that issue. Therefore, Allied's effect on subse-
quent cases that arise in a different procedural setting may be limited.
Because the Court framed the question presented in Allied so nar-
178. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976). See supra text at note 105.
179. See supra note 2 for text of § 8(b)(4)(B).
180. See supra note 2 for text of § 2(6) and (7).
181. 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1976).
182. See supra notes 102-11 and accompanying text.
183. 640 F.2d at 1370. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
184. 456 U.S. at 218. See supra notes 168-74 and accompanying text.
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rowly, its resolution of each of the three major issues involved may also
carry little weight in future litigation. Although the Court focused on
the effects of the ILA's conduct to determine the commerce jurisdiction
issue, it implicitly affirmed the Benz "object" approach.1"5 Thus, the
Allied Court injected some confusion into the traditional test of com-
merce jurisdiction. Because the Court's resolution of the secondary
boycott issue was based on the fact that eighty-five percent of Allied's
imports came from the Soviet Union, 186 its holding will provide little
guidance in cases where the amount of lost income is less than eighty-
five percent. Finally, because the Court's resolution of the first amend-
ment issue was based on an inappropriate analogy to labor picketing
cases and did not consider the political expression aspect of the ILA's
boycott, its reasoning is of little value for future litigation. Therefore,
the holding in Allied is extremely narrow and provides only general
guidelines for lower courts to decide these issues in future cases involv-
ing politically motivated secondary boycotts.
Leslie A. Watts
185. See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text.
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